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A B S T R A C T   
Payment for performance (P4P) has been employed in low and middle-income (LMIC) countries to improve 
quality and coverage of maternal and child health (MCH) services. However, there is a lack of consensus on how 
P4P affects health systems. There is a need to evaluate P4P effects on health systems using methods suitable for 
evaluating complex systems. We developed a causal loop diagram (CLD) to further understand the pathways to 
impact of P4P on delivery and uptake of MCH services in Tanzania. The CLD was developed and validated using 
qualitative data from a process evaluation of a P4P scheme in Tanzania, with additional stakeholder dialogue 
sought to strengthen confidence in the diagram. The CLD maps the interacting mechanisms involved in provider 
achievement of targets, reporting of health information, and population care seeking, and identifies those 
mechanisms affected by P4P. For example, the availability of drugs and medical commodities impacts not only 
provider achievement of P4P targets but also demand of services and is impacted by P4P through the availability 
of additional facility resources and the incentivisation of district managers to reduce drug stock outs. The CLD 
also identifies mechanisms key to facility achievement of targets but are not within the scope of the programme; 
the activities of health facility governing committees and community health workers, for example, are key to 
demand stimulation and effective resource use at the facility level but both groups were omitted from the 
incentive system. P4P design considerations generated from this work include appropriately incentivising the 
availability of drugs and staffing in facilities and those responsible for demand creation in communities. Further 
research using CLDs to study heath systems in LMIC is urgently needed to further our understanding of how 
systems respond to interventions and how to strengthen systems to deliver better coverage and quality of care.   
1. Introduction 
Payment for performance (P4P) programmes have been employed in 
many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to improve the quality 
and coverage of maternal and child health (MCH) services. Under P4P, 
health care providers, managers and/or organisations receive bonus 
payments that are tied to the delivery of pre-determined services or 
quality improvements (Mannion and Davies, 2008). The theoretical 
rationale for using financial incentives is to align incentives and be-
haviours of stakeholders within the health system in light of the agency 
relationships between managers, health care providers and patients, 
together with asymmetric information in these relationships (Fichera 
et al., 2014). Financial incentives are expected to motivate health 
workers to adhere to clinical care guidelines and increase the avail-
ability and quality of care delivered to patients (Gagné and Deci, 2005; 
Das et al., 2016). Many evaluations of P4P in LMIC have focused on 
estimating effects on elements within the health system, such as health 
worker job satisfaction (Shen et al., 2017; Engineer et al., 2016), health 
worker motivation (Shen et al., 2017; Engineer et al., 2016; Bhatnagar 
and George, 2016), availability of medical commodities (Das et al., 
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2016; Engineer et al., 2016; Bhatnagar and George, 2016), patient 
perceived quality of care (Das et al., 2016; Engineer et al., 2016; Paul 
et al., 2014) and accountability mechanisms (supervision of providers 
by managers (Bhatnagar and George, 2016; Paul et al., 2014; Mayumana 
et al., 2017) and community engagement in provision of services (En-
gineer et al., 2016; Mayumana et al., 2017)). 
There has been less attention to the causal mechanisms through 
which P4P improves service delivery or coverage of health services. 
Causal mediation analysis was recently employed to unpack the mech-
anisms through which P4P improves service indicators in two low- 
income settings, isolating potential mediators of programme effect 
(Anselmi et al., 2017; Ngo et al., 2017). However, such analyses examine 
one-directional static single chains of causality, ignoring feedback 
mechanisms, overlooking dynamics in the health system as a whole, and 
disregard intrinsic time delays. We must consider the holistic impact of 
interventions on the health system, not just acknowledging that con-
nections and mediators exist in isolation but how they affect each other 
over time. This knowledge is critical to understanding which design 
elements of P4P work and promote optimal health system behaviour (as 
intended) and which lead to suboptimal behaviour or negative unin-
tended consequences, undermining programme success. 
A recent realist review (Singh et al., 2021) identified pathways un-
derpinning P4P effectiveness, including outreach activities to generate 
demand for services, greater availability of drugs and medical supplies 
and provider adherence to clinical guidelines. The review also pointed to 
relevant contextual factors underpinning programme effectiveness, 
including facility staffing levels and facility autonomy. Whilst infor-
mative, few of the studies included in this review were designed to 
evaluate pathways to P4P effectiveness or provide evidence of a link 
between a given mechanism and outcome. 
Tools that derive from systems thinking methodologies can be used 
to better understand complex systems, such as health systems, and un-
pack the pathways to impact of interventions such as P4P (Borghi and 
Chalabi, 2017; Peters, 2014; Atun, 2012). Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) 
can identify and explore system problems and support decision making 
within health systems. They can also be used as a complementary tool to 
enhance other evaluation methods, such as realist evaluations, where 
there is a need to identify (and visualise) health system programme 
mechanisms and outcomes, and the context in which they are imple-
mented (Singh et al., 2021; Renmans et al., 2020). CLDs are not a suit-
able choice for testing and modelling potential solutions to problems. 
Instead, system dynamics models, which often utilise CLDs in their 
development, are a better fit for this research need (de Savigny et al., 
2017). 
CLDs depict cause and effect relationships between variables in a 
system and provide a visual representation of system structure, 
capturing cyclic ‘looping’ feedback (Tomoaia-Cotisel et al., 2017). CLDs 
use arrows, where arrow polarity signifies the effect of changes in one 
variable on another. Delays in influence of one variable on another can 
be shown in CLDs using the symbol of two lines through an arrow. 
Reinforcing (R) and balancing (B) loops are identified in a CLD using 
numbered, circular arrows; reinforcing loops describe pos-
itive/amplified behaviour and balancing loops describe neg-
ative/stabilising behaviour. For more information on interpretation of 
CLDs, please see Appendix A. There has been a steady rise in the 
application of CLDs to evaluate the impact of policies on health systems 
in high income settings (Rashwan et al., 2015; Schoenenberger et al., 
2016), most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic (Bradley et al., 
2020; Sahin et al., 2020). To our knowledge, only four studies have used 
these methods to examine the effect of P4P interventions on health 
systems (Singh et al., 2021; Alonge et al., 2017; Meker and Barlas, 2015; 
Renmans et al., 2017), three in low-income settings (Singh et al., 2021; 
Alonge et al., 2017; Renmans et al., 2017). 
The aim of this study was to develop a CLD to further understand the 
pathways to impact of P4P on delivery and uptake of MCH services in 
Tanzania, a low-income setting, and reflect on the insights gained from 
using this approach as compared to conventional evaluation methods. 
Tanzania was selected as a case study as it had implemented a P4P 
programme which was known to be effective in improving service up-
take (Binyaruka et al., 2015), and resulted in health system improve-
ments (provider kindness and greater drug availability) which mediated 
programme effects (Anselmi et al., 2017). There was also a wealth of 
evaluation data on the health system effects of the programme (Mayu-
mana et al., 2017; Binyaruka et al., 2015, 2018a; Binyaruka and Borghi, 
2017; Olafsdottir et al., 2014; Borghi et al., 2013; Binyaruka and 
Anselmi, 2020) to inform the CLD. 
1.1. Study setting 
Tanzania has experienced mixed progress in MCH over the last three 
decades (Afnan-Holmes et al., 2015) and implemented a P4P pro-
gramme in 2011 as part of a concerted effort to make progress towards 
Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 (Borghi et al., 2013). The design 
of the programme has been described extensively elsewhere (Binyaruka 
et al., 2015; Borghi et al., 2013), but a summary follows. The Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare in Tanzania, with funding from the Norwe-
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced a P4P initiative in 2011 in 
the region of Pwani. To be eligible to participate in the programme, 
facilities had to provide MCH services, hold or open a bank account and 
provide facility performance data from the previous year (2010–2011), 
which was used to set initial MCH service coverage targets. Facilities 
were eligible for incentive payments if they met targets for each 6 month 
cycle; either a percentage increase on the previous cycle’s performance 
or an absolute performance target (MoHSW Ministry of Health and So-
cial Welfare, 2012; Binyaruka et al., 2018b) (see Appendix B). For pri-
mary health care facilities (dispensaries and health centres), 75 % of this 
payment was to be distributed among health workers at the facility and 
the remaining funds were to be spent on facility improvements/demand 
creation (25 %). Managers at the district and regional level who were 
responsible for supporting facilities and verifying facility performance 
data, the Council Health Management Team (CHMT) and Regional 
Health Management Team (RHMT), were also eligible for incentives 
(Appendix B). 
2. Methods 
2.1. Secondary data 
We used qualitative data collected through a process evaluation 
during the Tanzania P4P programme (Borghi et al., 2013) to develop 
and validate a CLD (Table 1). These data describe how P4P was imple-
mented in different facilities, factors that affected the success of the 
programme and potential unintended consequences (Borghi et al., 
2013). Although secondary care facilities participated in the programme 
and consequent evaluation, due to programme design differences be-
tween providers, we focussed our evaluation on primary care facilities. 
Three rounds of data collection took place between December 
2011–March 2013. Interviews were conducted in five of the seven dis-
tricts in Pwani (Kibaha Town, Bagamoyo, Mkuranga, Kisarawe and 
Mafia island). Ten primary care health facilities were purposively 
sampled to reflect differences in level of care and ownership. Forty-three 
interviews were conducted with health workers, those in-charge of MCH 
care, those in-charge of facilities and members of the CHMT. Eight focus 
groups discussions (FGDs) were conducted with Health Facility Gov-
erning Committees (HFGC), CHMTs and health workers. Interviews 
were conducted in Swahili by four local social scientists working in 
pairs. All interviews were audio recorded and verbatim transcripts 
produced in Word, with transcripts translated to English. 
2.2. Primary data 
The CLD that was developed and validated using the secondary data 
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described in the previous section was also validated by additional 
stakeholders in three rounds of data collection between March and 
December 2020. Twenty-one stakeholders who were closely involved 
with the evaluation and implementation of P4P in Tanzania were invited 
to interview via email communication. Interviews were conducted over 
Zoom due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. In the final round of data 
collection, stakeholders were also sent a flyer and link to a short film 
introducing the research and purpose of interviews. Stakeholders were 
asked to confirm the structure of the CLD or indicate if changes needed 
to be made to reflect their experience of P4P (see Appendix C for 
interview tool). 
2.3. Creation of CLD 
There were three steps to developing the CLD. First we used sec-
ondary data (Table 1) to develop individual CLDs (Kim and Andersen, 
2012; Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018) representing stakeholder understanding 
of how P4P affects their local health system. Second, individual CLDs 
were combined in a step-wise process (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018) resulting 
in a single CLD, an initial shared mental model of P4P’s impact on the 
health system. Third, the combined CLD structure was validated to 
check to what extent additional stakeholders interviewed at the time of 
the original data collection agree on the structure of the system 
(Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018) and to check to what extent additional stake-
holders interviewed at the time of this study agreed that the CLD re-
flected their experience of the programme (Rwashana et al., 2014; 
Andersen et al., 2012). 
2.4. Step 1: creation of individual CLDs 
Interview and FGD transcripts were split into two groups; transcripts 
from districts A, C and E (Table 1) were used in Step 1 and 2 to develop 
an initial shared CLD (Fig. 1). These three districts (A, C and E) were 
selected to develop the initial shared CLD to represent variation in 
stakeholder group and geographical location. Transcripts from the 
remaining two districts (B and D) were used in Step 3 for initial vali-
dation of the CLD (Fig. 2). 
To develop individual stakeholder-specific CLDs, cause and effect 
relationships from each transcript were elicited using Purposive Text 
Analysis (Kim and Andersen, 2012) adapted for CLDs (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 
2018). Quotations were coded if they described events or scenarios that 
furthered understanding of how providers or health managers respon-
ded to the intervention in their facility or district, or demonstrated 
health system behaviour that facilitated or hindered facilities achieving 
P4P targets. Using this transformative process (Kim and Andersen, 2012; 
Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018), coding was used to develop a single CLD for 
each stakeholder interview (using Excel to store this information and 
Vensim software (Ventana Systems Inc. Vens, 2015) to develop the 
CLD). 
2.5. Step 2: creation of initial shared CLD 
To create the initial shared CLD (Fig. 1), we combined individual 
CLDs into team CLDs (representative of facility or district management) 
through a process called CLD Combination (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018). 
Individual stakeholder CLDs within teams were ordered according to 
their level of ‘complexity’, in terms of the number of variables, links, 
loops and delays. The most complex CLD, the ‘anchor’ CLD, was 
compared to the second most complex CLD. The anchor CLD was altered 
to reflect new information in the second CLD, through a new segment of 
the CLD or refinement of existing content. This altered CLD was then 
compared to the third most complex CLD and so on until all individual 
stakeholder CLDs within that team had been combined into one team 
Table 1 
Description of secondary data used to develop and validate causal loop diagram, 









District A Health Centre Health worker 2  
Dispensary Health worker 3  
CHMT CHMT 5 1 
District B Health Centre Health worker 4  
Dispensary Health worker 1  
HFGC  2 
CHMT CHMT 3  
District C Dispensary Health worker 1  
Dispensary Health worker 1  
HFGC  1 
CHMT CHMT 3  
District D Health Centre Health worker 2  
Dispensary Health worker 1  
CHMT CHMT 4 1 
District E Health Centre Health worker 4 1 
HFGC  1 
Dispensary Health worker 4  
CHMT CHMT 5 1 
Total 43 8 
Notes to Table: Council Health Management Team (CHMT) Focus group dis-
cussions (FGDs), Health Facility Governing Committee (HFGC). 
Fig. 1. Process for creating (1) individual CLDs and (2) initial shared CLD. 
Notes to Figure: Step (1) Development of individual CLDs based on districts A, C and E (Table 1) and Step (2) Merging individual causal loop diagrams to create a 
single shared causal loop diagram. The 51 transcripts comprise of the transcripts from 43 individual interviews and from 8 focus group discussions. A CLD was 
developed for each transcript, one FGD transcript was used to develop one CLD. Adapted from (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018). Causal Loop Diagram (CLD), Council Health 
Management Team (CHMT). 
R. Cassidy et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Social Science & Medicine 285 (2021) 114277
4
CLD. Where stakeholders described the same event but one CLD con-
tained more information (a more complex loop), the complex loop was 
retained if the additional information was deemed necessary to under-
standing the behaviour of that particular part of the system. Next, we 
combined team CLDs into three district level CLDs using the same 
approach. Lastly, we combined the three-district level CLDs to create a 
shared (single) CLD. 
2.6. Step 3: validation of initial shared CLD 
Lastly, validation of the initial shared CLD was performed to ensure 
that critical input from each of the three stakeholder groups (health 
centres, dispensaries and CHMT) had not been lost or misinterpreted 
during the CLD development process (Fig. 2). Validation comprised of 
two stages: first, the initial shared CLD was validated to check to what 
extent additional teams interviewed at the time of the original data 
collection agree on the structure of the system (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018) 
and second, the updated shared CLD was validated to check to what 
extent additional stakeholders interviewed at the time of this study 
agreed that the CLD reflected their experience of the programme 
(Rwashana et al., 2014; Andersen et al., 2012). 
In the first stage, we used interview and FGD data from districts B 
and D to generate 18 individual CLDs and then combined these indi-
vidual CLDs into six team CLDs. We then compared each team level CLD 
to the initial shared CLD from Step 2, to see to what extent the team level 
CLDs confirmed the structure of the shared CLD or if any changes were 
required to the diagram (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018). Structural changes 
were made to the shared CLD to reflect the new elements identified in 
the team level CLDs (additional links and variables to expand con-
cepts/loops already present in the CLD, modifications that increased 
understanding of supply of medical commodities at the facility). 
In the second stage of validation, the CLD resulting from the first 
phase of validation was presented to twenty-one stakeholders closely 
involved with the evaluation and implementation of the P4P programme 
(Rwashana et al., 2014; Andersen et al., 2012). Stakeholders were asked 
if they recognised the structure and elements in the CLD and if any 
changes were needed to reflect their own experience of the health sys-
tem and the P4P programme. This process aimed to minimise uncon-
scious bias, to identify and amend any misinterpretation of data and 
elicit any further missing content. Structural changes were made to the 
CLD as a result of these interviews (strengthened understanding on use 
of facility and CHMT funding, additional drivers for health worker 
motivation, additional complexity included on pathways for addressing 
staffing levels at facilities). 
2.7. Presentation of CLD 
We identify two categories of performance targets: ‘Number of 
women and children who receive incentivised services’ and ‘Submission 
of routine health facility data by providers’ (shown in bold in a high- 
level snapshot of CLD, Fig. 3). We identified three core mechanisms 
responsible for provider achievement of (or failure to reach) targets 
during the programme: (1) changes in the supply of services, (2) changes 
to facility reporting, and (3) changes in demand for services. We present 
an overview of each mechanism and the corresponding sections of the 
CLD (with the overall CLD shown in Appendix D), including stakeholder 
quotes from the qualitative data the CLD was developed from. 
3. Results 
3.1. Changes in the supply of services 
The mechanisms that result in changes in the supply of services 
during the P4P programme are presented in Fig. 4, with individual loops 
shown in Fig. 5. The ‘motivation – service delivery’ loop (Fig. 5A, R1) is 
a virtuous cycle of growing action where incentive payments to pro-
viders increase health worker motivation to exert effort towards 
incentivised services. At the start of the programme before any payments 
are made, the promise of future bonus payments motivates health 
workers to achieve targets. On receiving the P4P incentive payment, 
health workers feel further motivated to reach targets. This initial boost 
and then sustained level of motivation is dependent on bonus payments 
being made on time; where payments to facilities are delayed (a com-
mon issue during the first year of the scheme) staff become frustrated 
and apathetic about the programme. Health workers also feel motivated 
to continually exert effort where their exertion is recognised by those in 
senior roles at the facility (Fig. 5A, R2) and where supervision visits by 
the CHMT are taking place (Fig. 5A, R3), as this makes health workers 
feel valued. However, the CHMT can only perform supportive supervi-
sion where funds for per diems and transport are available. 
Health worker motivation to deliver incentivised services leads to 
timely requisition of medical commodities as seen in Fig. 5B, R4. As 
Fig. 2. Validation of initial shared CLD. 
Notes to Figure: Step (3i) Comparison with team level CLDs that were not used to develop the shared CLD in the previous stage. Step (3ii) New stakeholder interviews 
to validate CLD structure. Adapted from (Tomoaia-Cotisel, 2018; Rwashana et al., 2014; Andersen et al., 2012). Causal Loop Diagram (CLD), Council Health 
Management Team (CHMT). 
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shown in the ’ability’ loop (Fig. 5B, B1), providers can only deliver 
incentivised services where there are adequate levels of medical com-
modities. Providers become proactive in their requisition of these items 
in an effort to reduce stockouts; to ensure drugs and supplies are sent to 
the facility, requests need to be submitted within a strict timeframe. 
Requests are sent to the district pharmacist who liaises with the Medical 
Stores Department (MSD) (an autonomous government department) to 
procure drugs and medical supplies (Fig. 5B, B2). Delays and missing 
drugs in orders received from the MSD leads to failure of P4P service 
delivery targets if facilities are unable to procure from another source: 
“One of the indicators was vaccines they are supposed to be given, 
but there are no vaccines to offer, at the end the facility will not score 
but that is not the facility’s fault, it is somebody’s fault. You may find 
(…) that the MSD does not supply all the drugs requested (….)”. 
District level stakeholder, January 2012.  
When the MSD are unable to fulfil an order, two virtuous cycles of 
growing action become dominant; CHMT provision of resources and 
facility purchase of drugs/medical supplies outside of MSD. The 
reduction of drug and medical supply stockouts at the facility level is an 
incentivised indicator for CHMT, through which CHMT members are 
motivated to support facilities (Fig. 5C, R7) and provide medicine and 
medical equipment where needed (Fig. 5C, R5). Facilities also use their 
own funds to purchase medicine and medical supplies from other 
sources (outside of the MSD) where needed (Fig. 5C, R6): 
“There are changes, we used to get few drugs but since P4P started 
there is an improvement, if we get problems, we face our doctor (in 
charge) we use (…) P4P money to buy drugs. We take this 
opportunity to ask him to identify unavailable drugs in the facility 
then we buy them”. 
Facility level stakeholder, July 2012.  
However, this is dependent on health providers having funding 
available (achieving P4P targets and receiving bonus payments) 
(Fig. 5C, R8), facilities setting up and having access to a bank account 
and an active HFGC. The HFGC, comprised of community members and 
health workers, support provider decision-making on use of funds at the 
facility and approve the release of funds. An additional source of funding 
outside of P4P that can be used by facilities to purchase medicine and 
medical supplies is the Community Health Fund (CHF) (Fig. 5C, R9). 
Providers saw this voluntary health insurance scheme as an opportunity 
to raise additional funds for service delivery (as premium revenue is kept 
by the facility) and increase the likelihood of achieving P4P targets (see 
‘mechanisms that result in changes in the demand for services’ section 
for further details on the Fund). 
Health worker motivation is tied to worker ability to deliver services. 
Where there are shortages in medicine, medical supplies (Fig. 5D, B3) 
and inadequacies in the facility environment (old mattresses, lack of 
cleaning equipment) (Fig. 5D, R10) impeding health worker ability to 
deliver services, health workers feel frustrated and demotivated, 
affecting staffing levels at facilities: 
“They are frustrated by this (…) they had a medical doctor there, but 
he was not happy that he was sent to a facility that did not have a lot 
of equipment. He could not practice the skills he received during his 
training … so he was frustrated to the extent that he was planning to 
leave”. 
Fig. 3. High level snapshot of causal loop diagram. 
Notes to Figure: Three main mechanisms responsible for provider achievement of (or failure to reach) targets during P4P are shown in different colours. Changes in 
the supply of services (blue), changes to facility reporting (green), and changes in demand for services (red). 
R. Cassidy et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Social Science & Medicine 285 (2021) 114277
6
Programme evaluation researcher, November 2020.  
Adequate staffing levels and variety in the cadre of staff ensure an 
appropriate skill mix at the facility, to deliver more specialised services 
such as delivery care (Fig. 5D, R11). There were concerns that in facil-
ities with depleted staffing levels, health worker motivation to deliver 
incentivised services and achieve reporting targets would result in task- 
shifting away from non-incentivised services (illustrated in Fig. 5D). To 
address vacancies the District Executive Director would reallocate staff 
to facilities in need (Fig. 5D, B4) and the CHMT request funding/permits 
for new staff (Fig. 5D, B5). 
3.2. Changes to facility reporting 
The mechanisms that result in changes to facility reporting during 
the P4P programme are presented in Fig. 6, with individual loops shown 
in Fig. 7. The ‘motivation – reporting’ loop (Fig. 7A, R12) is a virtuous 
cycle of growing action where incentive payments to providers increase 
health worker reporting of facility activity to the CHMT. This task can 
take considerable time, and facilities need adequate staffing to achieve 
this target alongside service delivery (Fig. 7A, R13) (with mechanisms 
for addressing staffing levels discussed in the previous section): 
“Effort is done, we are expecting to get money in the third round, 
what was causing us not to get the money was the failure of sub-
mitting reports, the facility had one nurse. She said that she was 
Fig. 4. Changes in the supply of services during the programme that impact facility achievement of targets. 
Notes to Figure: Council Health Management Team (CHMT), Community Health Fund (CHF), District Executive Director (DED), Health Facility Governing Committee 
(HGFC), Medical Stores Department (MSD), Payment for performance (P4P). 
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overloaded, but since I arrived here the first thing I did was to make 
sure we submit reports”. 
Facility level stakeholder, July 2012.  
The ‘understanding’ loop (Fig. 7A, R14) is another virtuous cycle of 
growing action where health worker ability to undertake reporting is 
dependent on their knowledge of the reporting system. Health workers 
are sent for training at the start of the programme including on what 
routine health facility data should be reported to the CHMT. In facilities 
with high staff turnover, the training knowledge was lost with providers 
unable to achieve this target. 
District manager (CHMT) incentives are partly driven by complete-
ness of provider reporting (Fig. 7B, R15). CHMT members advise pro-
viders on record keeping and reporting during supervision visits. This 
offsets lack of provider knowledge (Fig. 7A, R14). In cases where facil-
ities are unable to physically submit reports (due to lack of funds, 
transport or staff) the CHMT collect reports to support timely submis-
sion. The bonus payments encouraged district managers to make su-
pervision visits: 
“The bonus is like a carrot we have to run for it (…) we are trying to 
improve our systems as time goes on (…). So, we decided to start 
collecting report(s) because we discovered this will be very helpful to 
us. Though we face transport problem(s), I remember the last trip I 
went for supervision (I) was not paid, I spent my own money from my 
pocket because the budget for supervision was very minimal (…)”. 
District level stakeholder, January 2012.  
The ‘temptation to misreport’ loop (Fig. 7B, R16) is a vicious cycle 
illustrating the temptation to game the system and record higher levels 
of service delivery than actually provided to achieve higher incentive 
payments. Where mis-reporting is suspected during verification visits, 
an investigation and potential suspension of facility and CHMT incentive 
payments is implemented. CHMT supervision visits act as a deterrent for 
misreporting (Fig. 7B, B6); district managers compare reported data 
with facility records to ensure reported performance is accurate. 
3.3. Changes in demand for services 
The mechanisms that result in changes in demand for services during 
the P4P programme are presented in Fig. 8, with individual loops shown 
in Fig. 9. Improved patient-provider interaction (perceived kindness and 
respect from health workers) observed during P4P leads to an increase in 
the patient perceived quality of services (Fig. 9A, R17) and facility 
reputation, affecting the care seeking of other women. 
“… workers are very polit(e) and kind to patients not like before. 
This surprise[s] the pregnant mothers, it is not like before when the 
workers were abusing them. Through P4P the pregnant mothers get 
good serve [health services] so she may tell her fellow [women] to 
come to the facility too [so] finally many of them will come to deliver 
[their babies] in the facility”. 
Facility level stakeholder, December 2011.  
A key mechanism to boost demand for services involves additional 
outreach activities carried out by providers in the community (Fig. 9A, 
R18). In some settings, this includes both community sensitisation ac-
tivities and use of a mobile clinic to offer immunization services. The 
additional interaction between patients and providers in the community 
provides the opportunity to raise awareness of services offered at the 
facility and build trust between women in the community and facility 
Fig. 5. Detailed views of the mechanisms that result in changes in the supply of services during the programme and impact facility achievement of targets. 
Notes to Figure: Council Health Management Team (CHMT), Community Health Fund (CHF), District Executive Director (DED), Health Facility Governing Committee 
(HGFC), Medical Stores Department (MSD), Payment for performance (P4P). 
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workers, resulting in greater service uptake. Although health workers 
feel motivated to perform outreach services, their ability to do so is 
heavily dependent on funding for transport/fuel (Fig. 9B, R19) and 
adequate staffing levels (Fig. 9B, R20). The work of community health 
workers (CHWs) in engaging community members and promoting 
health education is critical to raising awareness of health issues and 
available services (Fig. 9A): 
“You know the CHW, normally they come from the same community, 
and (…) are trusted people in that community. The community 
people are the one(s) who have chosen that person to be a commu-
nity health worker (…) so if anything, if that CHW tells the com-
munity about maybe malaria, they trust it through the CHW more 
than anybody else (…) sensitisation becomes easier because it is their 
own people who tell the story”. 
National level stakeholder, November 2020.  
Other mechanisms for increasing demand include improving the 
facility environment (Fig. 9B, R22) and incentivising traditional birth 
attendants (Fig. 9B, R21). Providers used their bonus payments to pur-
chase cleaning products, mattresses and other items to improve facility 
cleanliness and aesthetics. The facility environment is expected to 
impact patient perceived quality of services and decision to seek care, 
with improvements due to P4P, likely to increase demand from patients. 
Another innovative method employed by some facilities is to incentivise 
traditional birth attendants to boost the number of patients seeking care; 
incentive payments awarded to facilities who had increased their service 
performance are partially redistributed to traditional birth attendants 
who accompany women to attend facilities for institutional deliveries. 
A key element that feeds into patient perceived quality of services 
and decision to seek care is availability of medicine and medical supplies 
(Fig. 9C, B7); by increasing the availability of drugs and supplies 
(Fig. 5C, R8), P4P reduces the likelihood of patients paying out of 
pocket, which increases demand. Availability of medical commodities 
Fig. 6. Changes to facility reporting during the programme that impact facility achievement of targets. 
Notes to Figure: Council Health Management Team (CHMT), District Executive Director (DED), Payment for performance (P4P), Pilot Management Team (PMT). 
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also influences patient decision-making on membership of the commu-
nity health insurance scheme, CHF (Fig. 9C, R9). When drugs and sup-
plies are in stock, patients are more likely to register with the CHF, as 
they perceive services to be of better quality. Membership of the CHF 
also reduces the likelihood of paying out of pocket for care. The addi-
tional revenue from the CHF increases resource availability at the fa-
cility level which further increases demand for services. This cycle 
produces optimal behaviour when stocks of drugs and supplies are 
already at satisfactory levels; where they are diminished due to supply 
chain issues (Fig. 5B, B2) or funding (Fig. 5C, R8), this creates a vicious 
cycle. Lack of medicine leads to reduced payment into CHF, where 
community members anticipate their contributions will not guarantee 
availability of medicine, leading to lack of funding for medicine and 
supplies. An important measure to prevent this downward spiral is 
providers having an active, competent HFGC. In addition to advising 
providers on use of facility funds, the HFGC also promote community 
contribution into the Fund through community mobilisation and 
education: 
"The health facility governing committee (HFGC) were not active, I 
remember it was in May when they were told about their roles as 
HFGC members. They were told why facilities run out of drugs, it just 
because people do not want to join CHF, I am telling you that HFGC 
members came up with action plan, they planed that when they go 
back to their villages, they are going to join CHF as well as to 
sensitize other village members to join CHF. This will let the com-
munity know that they must contribute for drugs." 
District level stakeholder, July 2012. 
4. Discussion 
We used CLDs to provide insight into how facilities and district 
managers responded to P4P and shed light on mechanisms involved in 
provider achievement of MCH and facility reporting targets, and 
contextual factors supporting or impeding these. On the supply side, we 
observed how health worker motivation and ability of health workers to 
provide services were critical to achievement of P4P targets. Health 
Fig. 7. Detailed views of the mechanisms that result in changes to facility reporting during the programme and impact facility achievement of targets. 
Notes to Figure: Council Health Management Team (CHMT), District Executive Director (DED), Payment for performance (P4P), Pilot Management Team (PMT). 
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worker motivation and ability to deliver services were dependant on 
factors directly affected by P4P (timely receipt of incentive payments, 
ability to purchase drugs and medical supplies using incentive pay-
ments) but importantly also on factors outside of programme influence 
(number of health workers, drugs and medical supplies supply chain, 
core facility funding). In the same vein, we observed that routine 
reporting of health facility data was heavily dependent on support given 
by the CHMT (directly influenced by P4P) but also by the composition of 
health workers at the facility (not directly affected by P4P). On the de-
mand side, we observed the importance of patient perceived quality of 
services and community awareness of facility services (both partly 
influenced by P4P) in leading to a higher number of patients seeking 
care and facility achievement of P4P targets. 
These three overarching mechanisms that resulted in provider 
achievement of targets are closely interconnected (Fig. 3), with changes 
in one part of the system leading to knock-on effects in other parts of the 
system. Using the CLD, it is possible to identify catalytic variables in the 
system; variables that affect multiple outcomes or mechanisms and 
therefore deserve careful consideration in the design of P4P schemes. 
Facility readiness, and especially the availability of drugs and medical 
supplies, is critical to service delivery. Not only in the direct sense of 
availability of drugs enabling health workers to deliver services but it is 
also critical to health worker motivation to deliver services. Facility 
readiness also influences patient perceived quality of facility services 
and feeds into the decision to seek care at the facility and decision to 
financially support the facility by enrolling in the community-based 
health insurance scheme. This variable was key to facilitating the sup-
ply and demand side mechanisms that led to facility achievement of P4P 
targets. 
Staffing levels and supervision of facilities by district level managers 
are also catalytic variables. Supply of services at the facility, outreach 
activities (impacting demand for services) and facility reporting mech-
anisms (timely completion and submission of reports) only exhibited 
optimal behaviour where there were adequate levels of staffing at fa-
cilities. Supply of services and facility reporting mechanisms were also 
influenced by district management team supervision, with support 
leading to a more motivated workforce and facilitating provider ability 
to undertake routine data reporting. 
The CLD also unearths potential system levers which are not targeted 
by P4P but could be incorporated to enhance the effect of the pro-
gramme. CHF, the community-based health insurance scheme, was an 
additional source of revenue for facilities that could be used to purchase 
medical commodities and enhance their ability to achieve targets. We 
found that facilities often drew on the CHF as a lever to enhance per-
formance. Community contributions into the CHF were dependent on 
community sensitisation on CHF by the HFGC, and the availability of 
drugs and supplies (as their absence led to out-of-pocket payments). 
HFGC members were not incentivised as part of P4P and yet were in-
tegral to facility success during the programme through their role in 
mobilising community contributions to the CHF and as signatories on 
facility expenditures. CHWs were also a non-incentivised group that 
were instrumental in stimulating demand for services at facilities, 
leading to facility achievement of P4P targets. CHWs provided a crucial 
flow of information from providers to the wider community; they were 
seen as trusted members of the community, able to promote health ed-
ucation and spread awareness on facility services and operation. The 
lack of incentivisation of these stakeholders sometimes undermined 
their leverage by facilities to achieve performance goals, where this 
created bad feeling. Incentivising other key stakeholders who operate at 
the facility and community level seems an appropriate element in the 
design of P4P schemes in LMICs. 
This study sheds light on those P4P design features which were most 
important in achieving outcomes, and how programme design could be 
improved to enhance effects. For example, the facility-level incentive 
and incentivisation of district managers based on drug availability was 
critical to the programme resulting in the reduction in stock outs of 
drugs and supplies – which was a catalytic variable key to service de-
livery and demand for care. In settings where the availability of drugs 
and supplies is limited, it is essential that a share of the P4P incentive 
payments go to facilities to enable their procurement of drugs and 
supplies, and that other stakeholders that can facilitate access to drugs 
and supplies be incentivised as well (in this case district managers). To 
Fig. 8. Changes in demand for services during the programme that impact facility achievement of targets. 
Notes to Figure: Council Health Management Team (CHMT), Community Health Fund (CHF), Community Health Workers (CHWs), District Executive Director (DED), 
Health Facility Governing Committee (HGFC). 
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Fig. 9. Detailed views of the mechanisms that result in changes in demand for services during the programme and impact facility achievement of targets. 
Notes to Figure: Council Health Management Team (CHMT), Community Health Fund (CHF), Community Health Workers (CHWs), District Executive Director (DED), 
Health Facility Governing Committee (HGFC). 
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further strengthen the effect of the programme on drugs and supplies, 
and align incentives across levels of the health system, the central MSD 
might have been incentivised (as has been observed in the design of the 
most recent, scaled-up version of P4P in Tanzania) (MoHSW Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare, n.d.). Delays, due to late submission of stock 
orders by facilities or stockouts at the MSD, may have been mitigated if 
the MSD had been either incentivised or supported as part of the pro-
gramme design. Strengthening the supply chain of medical commodities 
might be assisted through other system strengthening initiatives outside 
of P4P, such as a redesign of logistic systems and availability of vehicles 
for transport of medical commodities (strategic reforms recently tested 
by the Global Health Fund in discussion with the Tanzania government 
(Githendu et al., 2020)). 
Our study also identifies health system features which were critical 
to the supply and demand of services but were not impacted by the 
programme, due to their omission from the design. Staffing levels were 
critical to achieving outcomes, but this was largely outside of the control 
of facilities and districts. While district managers could reallocate staff 
within the district from higher to lower staffed facilities, they could not 
recruit new staff, even for facilities that were understaffed relative to 
staffing norms. Although reallocation of staff could be an incentivised 
target for district managers, without the capacity to hire new staff 
(managed at the government level and subject to restrictions on budget) 
this may not be a suitable target for P4P in Tanzania. Lastly, HFGC and 
CHW were critical stakeholders to boost demand for services, and in the 
case of HFGC, ensure full and effective use of facility resources, yet they 
were omitted from the incentive system. To maximise programme 
effectiveness, all stakeholders that are critical to achieving supply and 
demand side goals should be identified and, if possible, integrated into 
the incentive system. Our findings suggest that P4P as currently 
designed, would work best in facilities with adequate drug and supply 
availability and staffing levels. 
Our study adds to the existing evidence base examining the effects of 
the P4P pilot in Tanzania on the health system and population (Mayu-
mana et al., 2017; Anselmi et al., 2017; Binyaruka et al., 2015, 2018a; 
Binyaruka and Borghi, 2017; Olafsdottir et al., 2014; Binyaruka and 
Anselmi, 2020), by identifying those variables which are really catalytic 
both in terms of achieving performance targets (e.g. drugs), and limiting 
their achievement (staffing). The CLD also identifies pathways to im-
provements and potential pathways to harm (unintended negative ef-
fects), and system levers which are outside the scope of the programme 
but can be leveraged by providers to help achieve programme goals. 
Two other studies have used CLDs to evaluate the impact of P4P 
programmes on health systems in low-income countries (Alonge et al., 
2017; Renmans et al., 2017). A CLD of P4P in Afghanistan (Alonge et al., 
2017) also identified the effect of service utilisation on facility revenue, 
and of health worker motivation on uptake of services. However, the 
Afghan CLD includes a highly a composite quality variable (representing 
time spent with patients, drug availability, perception of care and other 
measures). Our study shows these measures of quality do not necessarily 
move in the same direction over time and are, therefore, better observed 
separately. The Afghan CLD also excludes supervision and staffing 
which we found to be important influences on outcomes. A CLD of P4P 
in Uganda (Renmans et al., 2017) identified the importance of 
district-level supervision on health worker motivation and knowledge, 
as in our study, and investments in the facility environment leading to 
increased care seeking. However, medicines and infrastructure are 
combined in a ‘work environment’ variable, and unlike our study, the 
medicines supply chain is not included in the CLD. Reporting of health 
facility data was not an incentivised target in the Ugandan P4P pro-
gramme and was therefore excluded from the CLD. 
Singh et al. (2021) used a CLD to synthesize evidence identified in a 
realist review. Like our study, the realist review identifies drug avail-
ability, health worker kindness and outreach services as key mecha-
nisms underpinning P4P effects on utilisation outcomes. Our study 
contributes further evidence on availability of drugs as a critical factor in 
community demand for community based health insurance, and the 
positive relationship between insurance uptake and drug availability. 
We also identify pathways between facility readiness and health worker 
motivation, and between supervision and deterrence from misreporting 
data. 
There are a number of limitations to this study. Data used to develop 
the CLD were not collected for this purpose, which may have limited the 
degree of causal statements. However, this approach is highly cost- 
effective by limiting the primary data collection that is needed. As the 
CLD was developed by one researcher, there is a risk that unconscious 
bias may have gone unchecked in the CLD. However, we found the CLD 
to be well supported during validation. On the methods front, we could 
have used more objective methods to compare pairs of CLDs prior to 
combining them; mathematical graph theory has been used previously 
to compare pairs of CLDs (Markóczy, 1995; Schaffernicht and Groesser, 
2011). However, because of the large number of CLDs involved, it was 
more practical to use qualitative reasoning methods to compare the 
CLDs and then combine them. While we had planned to conduct face to 
face validation interviews, due to COVID-19 these were conducted via 
Zoom. However, this online format worked effectively. To reduce the 
risk of recall bias stakeholders were encouraged to say when they were 
not confident in their recollection of events. Stakeholders often offered 
anecdotes and reflections to support their confirmation of model struc-
ture (or recommendation for changes) which strengthened confidence in 
their ability to provide evidence on their experience of the programme. 
Another limitation is the generalisability of the CLD to represent 
pathways to impact of P4P on delivery and uptake of MCH services in 
other types of facilities (secondary care providers). Study authors 
decided to exclude secondary data collected on secondary care facilities 
due to the substantial programme design differences between hospitals 
and lower-level facilities (health centres and dispensaries), and the 
much larger number of primary care facilities included in the pro-
gramme. Given these facility operation and design differences, the 
current CLD would not be generalisable to secondary care facilities. 
A further limitation of this work is that we did not have data from 
patients themselves which may have highlighted other variables of 
relevance to care seeking practices. We intend to develop a system dy-
namics simulation model in later work that will use survey data from 
patients to explore the dynamic hypothesis raised in the CLD. The CLD 
gave an indication of variables which were more or less frequently 
mentioned, but it does not allow us to quantify the relative impact of 
different variables or loops within the system. Without quantifying 
relative and combined effects, it is difficult to estimate how key out-
comes would be impacted by P4P design changes and understand the 
reasons for the dynamic behaviour playing out over time. However, in 
the system dynamics modelling research we have planned, we will be 
able to identify the key/dominant loops in the CLD by quantifying how 
mechanisms/loops change over time in response to P4P using the 
developed simulation model. The model will allow us to quantify re-
lationships between variables and measure the effect a given loop has on 
key outcomes. 
The CLD identified key mechanisms underpinning facility achieve-
ment of P4P targets, catalytic mechanisms impacting multiple outcomes 
and potential levers, and design modifications to improve programme 
effectiveness. Further research using CLDs to study heath systems in 
LMIC is urgently needed to further our understanding of how systems 
respond to interventions and how to strengthen systems to deliver better 
coverage and quality of care. 
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Gagné, M., Deci, E.L., 2005. Self-determination theory and work motivation. J. Organ. 
Behav. 26, 331–362. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.322. 
Githendu, P., Morrison, L., Silaa, R., Pothapregada, S., Asiimwe, S., Idris, R., et al., 2020. 
Transformation of the Tanzania medical store department through global fund 
support: an impact assessment study. BMJ Open 10, e040276. https://doi.org/ 
10.1136/bmjopen-2020-040276. 
Kim, H., Andersen, D.F., 2012. Building confidence in causal maps generated from 
purposive text data: mapping transcripts of the Federal Reserve. Syst. Dynam. Rev. 
28, 311–328. https://doi.org/10.1002/sdr.1480. 
Mannion, R., Davies, H.T.O., 2008. Payment for performance in health care. BMJ 336, 
306–308. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39463.454815.94. 
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